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The Munich Conference and the events leading up to it have been the topics of 
many scholarly discussions; however, few have investigated the parochial perspective of 
the national interests of the two countries which were most intimately involved in the fmal 
settlement: Great Britain and France. 
At the time of the Munich Conference in 1938, the world did not have a sense of the 
sanctity and the validity of international law. Therefore, one cannot speak about the legality 
or the illegality of the decisions that were taken 50 years ago. In fact, by 1938 the attempt 
to codify international law, and establish an institutionalized system for the solution of 
international disputes by peaceful means, The League of Nations, had already failed. 
Therefore, when we discuss the Munich Agreement we cannot rely on abstract 
concepts of international law, morality or ethics. Instead, we must, unfortunately, ap-
proach the issue from the perspective of clashing national interests. Of primary importance 
to such a discussion are the national interests of Great Britain and France. 
The British position in Munich was rather straightforward. The documents that 
would help us to understand the British position have been in the public domain for 
decades, so it seems one can speak about British policy in Munich with a great deal of con-
fidence. 
Great Britain had no interest whatsoever in preserving the territorial integrity of the 
nation-state of Czechoslovakia. It had minimal economic interests in the state. Indeed it 
had minimal interests in Eastern Europe as a whole. Furthermore, ever since the Treaties 
of Versailles, St. Germain and Trianon, the three peace treaties signed in and around the 
city of Paris in 1919-1920 after World War I, Great Britain exhibited a lack of support for 
the new international system, including its most visible manifestation, the League of 
Nations. Specifically, at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919-1920, Lloyd George, the 
Prime Minister and the spokesman for the British delegation, consistently opposed the 
mostly French attempt to redraw the map of Europe in such a way as to insure that 
Germany would never again threaten the stability and the security of the continent. The 
British delegation was very ill at ease with the new international system that was estab-
lished, even before the ink was dry on those peace treaties. In particular the British were 
very uncomfortable that the principle of national self-determination, applied to the recon-
struction of Europe after the War through the influence of President Wilson, was violated 
in a number of cases, notoriously and notably in the case of Czechoslovakia. 
When the new state of Czechoslovakia was formally established and recognized by 
the Great Powers, it included large minorities which did not speak the Czech language and 
did not consider themselves part of the new Czechoslovak state. In particular, the 3.25 
million comprising the German-speaking minority in the borderlands of Bohemia (later 
known as the Sudetenland) were regarded as a potential threat to the stability of the 
Czechoslovak state going as far back as 1919. 
The British recognized this anomaly and battled with the French. They eventually 
lost. When the new Czechoslovak state was formed, therefore, it included not only a large 
German-speaking minority, but also a large Hungarian-speaking minority in Slovakia, a 
considerable Polish minority in the former duchy of Teschen and a considerable minority of 
Ukrainians or Ruthenians in the east portion of the state. In short, Czechoslovakia repre-
sented a contradiction to the general theme of the Paris Peace Conference, namely the 
application of national self-determination to the new map of Europe. 
In the 1920s, the issue of Czechoslovakia's national integrity did not intrude itself 
onto the consciousness of the British, and therefore they did not feel compelled to deal with 
it. After the advent of the Hitler Regime in Germany in January 1933, however, it became 
an issue, as did the status of all other German-speaking minorities in countries outside of 
Germany, including Austria and Poland. 
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In the spring of 1938, following the AnschlujJ, the British unmistakably conveyed 
to the world in general, and to their French allies in particular, that they had no intention of 
participating in any diplomatic settlement in Eastern Europe which would support the inter-
ests of Czechoslovakia against Germany. Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, in a back-
ground conference with journalists at the time, made it unmistakably clear that he recog-
nized the essential validity of Hitler's claims that the 3.25 million German-speaking citizens 
in the Sudetenland deserved to have at least autonomy within Czechoslovakia and, if they 
so desired, separation from that state and annexation by Germany. 
In addition to the guilt the British felt about the Treaty of St. Germain, which 
established the Czechoslovak State, as well as the guilt they felt about the settlement in 
Eastern Europe (the former Habsburg Empire), there are other factors worth noting which 
played an important role in the eventual pursuit of the appeasement policy. An important 
factor was Great Britain's decision in 1920-1921 to disengage herself from the European 
continent and to focus her intentions, not exclusively, but predominantly, on her imperial 
and naval interests outside Europe. Henceforth, the balance of power in Europe became a 
secondary concern of the British. They were unwilling to go to war at any time in the 
1920s or 1930s, up until the spring of 1939, to guarantee the political settlement in Eastern 
Europe. They were willing to guarantee the political settlement in Western Europe thanks 
to their endorsement of the Locamo Treaty of 1925, but they were not prepared to guaran-
tee the political settlement east of the Rhine. 
Another factor in British foreign policy toward the problem of Czechoslovakia and 
the Sudetenland in particular was the very strong suspicion the British ruling elite held vis-
a-vis the Soviet Union, both in ideological and realpolitical terms. In ideological terms, 
this suspicion was influenced at the time by the essentially anti-Bolshevik position of the 
dominant British Conservative Party. In realpolitical terms, the British were concerned that 
the Soviet Union threatened the interests of the British Empire, particularly in Central Asia. 
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Under these suspicions, the British were not going to intervene in the affairs of Central 
Europe or Eastern Europe in such a way that would assist the Soviet Union. 
It comes as no surprise, therefore, that the Chamberlain government, in the autumn 
of 1938, pressed for a solution to the crisis in Czechoslovakia that would enable Germany 
to annex the Sudeten regions of Bohemia, which included within its population at least 50 
percent German-speaking citizens. They never wavered from that policy and they pursued 
it with determination to the very end at the Munich Conference. 
The position of the French, on the other hand, is much more interesting, much 
more nuanced and, perhaps, worth a more careful examination than the British policy. We 
do not know and we will probably never know precisely what motivated the French for one 
very good reason: the information and documents available are very sparse indeed. First 
of all, the French, unlike the British, do not permit minutes to be taken at cabinet meetings. 
Consequently, no records are available from those crucial meetings in the summer and fall 
of 1938, which determined French policy during the Czechoslovak crisis. Secondly, the 
diplomatic documents of the French Foreign Ministry at the Quai d'Orsay are very 
unreliable, largely because a considerable portion of them was destroyed in May 1939 to 
avoid capture by the German army approaching Paris. Those remaining were destroyed in 
the summer of 1944 when fire broke out in the French Foreign Ministry during the 
liberation of Paris. Thirdly, the memoirs of the policy makers at the time are simply 
without merit and cannot be relied upon for accuracy. The French Foreign Minister during 
this period, Georges Bonnet, consistently doctored documents and manipulated 
information in such a way as to make it virtually unreliable. 
It is, therefore, a daunting prospect to piece together the disparate elements of 
French foreign policy during the Munich crisis. The French position is much more am-
biguous than the British position. The British pursued appeasement continually. They had 
no interest in going to war over Czechoslovakia, and indeed they acted in a very logical and 
consistent manner given the general ideological and doctrinal position they took. 
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France, however, was an ally of Czechoslovakia. It signed an alliance with 
Czechoslovakia in 1924 and updated it again in the aftermath of the Locarno Conference of 
1925, whereby France was committed, unlike Great Britain, to the defense of 
Czechoslovakia in the event of unprovoked aggression. The French continually reaffirmed 
their pledge to that alliance. 
The important point to keep in mind, however, is that that alliance with 
Czechoslovakia was agreed upon in the first half of the 1920s, at a time when France was 
pursuing a very aggressive diplomatic policy which was aimed at straightjacketing 
Germany, i.e., Weimar Germany, not Hitler's Germany, through the establishment of bi-
lateral connections with as many powers as France could possibly find in Eastern Europe. 
They entered into an alliance with Poland in 1921 , with Czechoslovakia in 1924, and then, 
in the second half of the 1920s, France signed treaties of friendship with Yugoslavia and 
Rumania. 
In short, the French were attempting to ring Germany with a set of hostile states. 
They did so for two reasons . First, they did not have the benefit of an alliance with the 
United States and with Great Britain, that is, security treaties that would commit the two 
Anglo-Saxon powers to the defense of France in the event of unprovoked aggression from 
Germany. This arrangement had been an objective of French diplomacy since the Paris 
Peace Conferences. It never came to pass, or more accurately, it was agreed to by the 
heads of state at the Paris Peace Conference, but never put into practice. Secondly, France 
did not have the benefit of the great alliance that she had in 1914 which had permitted her to 
foil the German war plan in the early months of World War I, viz., the alliance with 
Russia. Russia was traditionally regarded as the natural counterweight to German expan-
sion in the East, and therefore a natural ally for France. 
After World War I, of course, Soviet Russia was unavailable as an ally. She was 
racked with revolution, counterrevolution, and civil war. There was a number of disputes 
and conflicts between France and Lenin's Russia concerning pre-war debts which made it 
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impossible for Paris and Moscow to become allies. Finally, in 1935, France overcame her 
ideological hostility and signed a mutual defense treaty with the Soviet Union. The French, 
however, were unwilling or incapable of translating the 1935 treaty into an ironclad military 
alliance. Therefore, the Soviet attempt to involve the French in joint staff talks to 
coordinate strategy and tactics and to share intelligence came to naught. 
Why did France fail to make good on the original intention of resurrecting the old 
Franco-Russian alliance and what are the implications of that for the position of 
Czechoslovakia in 1938? First, the French did not believe the Soviet Union would be a 
reliable ally. Russia had signed a separate peace with the Germans in March 1918, and had 
pulled out of theW ar. Paris expected that, in case of another war, Moscow would again 
sign a separate peace with the Germans and pull out Second, the French did not consider 
the Red Army a very valuable commodity in 1938. In the Big Purge of 1937-8, Stalin had 
liquidated many of the best army and navy officers. The Red Army was in total disarray, 
and, a decimated force, an army without a head. Third, even if the Soviet Union could 
have been trusted, even if the Red Army had not experienced the trauma of the 1930s 
purges, the Soviet Union had no way of participating in a war against Germany because the 
two countries did not share a common frontier. Poland and Romania stood between the 
Soviet Union, Germany and Czechoslovakia. From the French point of view, therefore, 
the Red Army was a useless ally in the forthcoming conflict with Germany. 
After Hitler heated up the temperature in the summer and fall of 1938, the French 
felt they were facing a hopeless diplomatic and military situation. Belgium, France's ally 
since 1920, had reneged on its commitment and had abrogated its alliance with France in 
1936. On several occasions the Belgian government informed the French that, were 
French military forces to seek transit rights across Belgian territories in 1938 to come to the 
defense of their Czechoslovak ally in a war with Germany, the Belgian army would resist 
and go to war with France. 
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Yet the most important point, often overlooked by historians of the Munich agree-
ment, is that by the end of the 1920s, the French had de facto abandoned the possibility of 
pursuing an offensive military policy in Eastern Europe. They abandoned this policy be-
cause tof pressure, primarily from the British and the Americans, to give up the Rhineland 
as a buffer zone between Germany and France. The Rhineland enabled France to intervene 
in Western Germany, particularly in the Ruhr Valley, the center of Germany's military and 
economic might. Once the French were persuaded to evacuate the region five years ahead 
of schedule, as a consequence of the Young Plan of 1929, and once they were persuaded to 
give up the right they had according to the Treaty of Versailles to prolong their occupation 
of the Rhineland should national security interests justify the action, they had, in effect, 
given up the possibility of playing a significant military role in Eastern Europe. 
It is no coincidence that in 1929, the very year the French agreed to evacuate the 
Rhineland, they began construction of the Maginot line. From 1929 and throughout the 
1930s, the French recognized that their only hope was in husbanding their military and 
economic resources, such as they were, behind a system of stationary fortifications, and 
protecting themselves against what the French called an "attaque brusque," a sudden, 
surprise attack which would lead to a rapid disintegration of French defense. In case of 
war, French strategists decided to mobilize their resources, and to hope that the British and 
the Americans would come to their aid as they did in 1914 and 1917, respectively. By 
implication, the French gave up any hope of protecting their allies in Eastern Europe, 
particularly Czechoslovakia. 
From that point on, French foreign policy towards Czechoslovakia was character-
ized by what can only be called an illusion: an ironclad diplomatic commitment to defend 
Czechoslovakia in the event she was subjected to an unprovoked aggression from 
Germany, coupled with a military strategy which emphasized the protection of French na-
tional territory and did not even provide for the kind of offensive warfare that alone would 
permit France to deter Germany in 1938 from meddling in Czechoslovak affairs. 
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When the Berchtesgaden, Godesberg, and ultimately Munich conferences were held 
between Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Hitler, in September 1938, the French had already 
given up even the slightest hope of affecting a military solution to the problem. The only 
solution which ultimately remained could be a political one. The political solution agreed 
upon was a tawdry, shabby affair from the standpoint of all concerned, including the 
French, who were embarrassed by it. But it spared them, they thought, a new war. 
Make no mistake about it. Hitler wanted a war in 1938. He was willing to fight. 
He was eager to go to war and regarded Munich as a great diplomatic defeat after the con-
ference broke up because it prevented him from going to war. He wanted to annihilate the 
Czechoslovak state; he did not want to slice off the Bohemian borderland, he wanted to de-
stroy Czechoslovakia. Now he had to wait another six months to do that. 
The French were not ready for war, did not want war. They certainly were not 
going to go to war to defend seven million Czechs against the grievances of 3.25 million 
Germans. 
Throughout the negotiations between the British and the French in the summer and 
fall of 1938, there is, I think, a common theme: the French, taking a strong position of de-
fending their Czechoslovak ally, the British, refusing to support them, and then the French 
using the pretext of that refusal to back down. Over and over again, M. Edouard Daladier, 
the Prime Minister of France, used the opposition of Mr. Neville Chamberlain, the Prime 
Minister of Great Britain, to justify the underlying objective of French foreign policy since 
the advent of the 1930s: to seek a political solution to the embarrassing remnants of the 
early 1920s when France could still attempt to enforce her will on Germany and to seek a 
diplomatic solution which would enable Germany to cast off the shackles of Versailles, 
without leading to what everyone in France wanted to avoid: a repetition of the Great War. 
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